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The Political Economy of Investment 
in Renewable Electricity in Kenya
Helen Hoka Osiolo, Ana Pueyo and James Gachanja
Abstract Kenya has been hailed as a successful sub-Saharan African country 
in attracting private investment for renewable energy. However, energy 
poverty remains very high, with connectivity rates lower than the average 
for sub-Saharan Africa and poor quality of supply for those connected. 
Several constraints persist to achieve universal access to clean and 
affordable electricity: high system costs, including a deficient transmission 
and distribution infrastructure; low rural demand and inadequate planning 
to meet it; and local opposition to large renewable infrastructure. This 
article considers the political economy of these constraints, explaining 
how they arose, which policies can address them and which actors back or 
oppose these policies. The overarching message is that a prominent state 
role is required to fund the network components of the electricity system 
and to reach the less profitable segments of society, namely the rural poor. 
However, this clashes with a dominant private sector-led narrative in the 
international development community.
Keywords: renewable energy, political economy, Kenya, electricity, 
sub‑Saharan Africa, investment, constraints.
1 Introduction
Kenya is one of  the African countries with the largest share of  
renewables in its generation mix. In 2015, renewables supplied over 
70 per cent of  electricity, mainly from hydropower and geothermal 
plants. Hydropower was the dominant source in the past, like in 
many other African countries, but the government sought to diversify 
supply to improve energy security. Geothermal was the preferred 
technology, because it could generate large quantities of  least‑cost 
base load electricity, which is the type of  electricity that is available 
all the time to meet minimum demand. To harness their vast 
geothermal resources located along the Rift Valley, Kenya put in place 
a long‑term geothermal development programme, largely supported 
by international donors through technical assistance and concessional 
finance. Kenya has subsequently become the largest producer of  
geothermal energy in Africa. Wind has also played an increasing role 
in the generation basket, and the country will soon boast the largest 
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wind power plant in Africa, with the 310MW Lake Turkana wind farm 
currently under construction.
Despite a good track record in attracting private investment for renewable 
energy generation, some problems still persist, which prevent the goal 
of  achieving universal access to clean, reliable, and affordable energy in 
Kenya. Connectivity rates remain lower than the sub‑Saharan African 
average, and reliability is low for those connected outside of  the cities, 
mainly as a result of  an insufficient transmission and distribution network.
Many constraints prevail to increase investment in renewable energy 
that improves access to affordable, clean, and reliable electricity 
in Kenya, but some are more important than others. In a separate 
publication (Pueyo et al. 2017), we applied the new Green Investment 
Diagnostics methodology to identify the most binding constraints that if  
tackled could deliver the biggest ‘bang for the buck’ of  the policymaker. 
We followed a systematic approach using a decision tree analysis 
drawing from the original growth diagnostics approach (Hausmann, 
Rodrik and Velasco 2004) and building evidence through the collection 
of  indicators and interviews with key stakeholders from the government, 
project developers, technical advisers, sectoral associations, and financial 
institutions. Three key constraints preventing further investment in 
renewables came up strongly from our analysis: low demand and 
inability to pay in rural areas; high system costs due to a lack of  
networking infrastructure and an inflexible generation mix; and serious 
problems of  social acceptance and access to land.
Identifying the most important constraints is essential, but not sufficient. 
To have their predicted effect, policies need to be implemented, and 
this is not a technical question, but a matter of  political economy. Our 
political economy analysis looks at the underlying interests behind 
each constraint, the most promising policies to address them, and the 
actors who may block or support suitable policies. For our analysis we 
interviewed ten key stakeholders from the Kenyan energy sector.1 We 
posed two questions: how did each of  our identified constraints come to 
be? And who is driving or opposing policies to address it? The political 
economy analysis of  constraints to RE investment required first a 
record of  the policies that exist, and the development of  an inventory of  
stakeholders or actors who have an influence on the targets and policies 
to improve the investment environment for renewable energy.
These are included in Section 2. Sections 3, 4, and 5 analyse each of  
the key constraints to investment in Kenya and the related policies that 
could solve them. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of  the actors 
that support or oppose the policies required and the political alliances 
that could solve the impasse.
2 Policy and stakeholder mapping for renewable energy in Kenya
The key policy documents for Kenya’s energy sector are the 
Sessional Paper No. 4 of  2004 (Government of  Kenya 2004) and the 
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Energy Act No. 12 of  2006. They set up the institutional framework 
of  the power sector after a process of  liberalisation that started in the 
mid‑1990s. These have been recently reviewed through the Energy 
Bill 2015, to align them to the national development strategy set out in 
Vision 2030 (Government of  Kenya 2007) and the new Constitution of  
2010, which established a devolved government system.
The 2006 Energy Act succeeded the Electric Power Act No. 11 of  
1997. It provided for the establishment of  a number of  unbundled 
organisations evolving from the previous centralised, vertically integrated 
state utility. The public utility Kengen jointly with private independent 
power producers (IPPs) would undertake generation, whereas the natural 
monopolies of  transmission and distribution would be separated into 
two state‑owned enterprises: the transmission company KETRACO 
and the distribution company Kenya Power. While KETRACO is fully 
owned by the Government of  Kenya, Kenya Power is listed on the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange, with the government holding 50.1 per cent of  
shares. The 2006 Energy Act also established the Rural Electrification 
Agency (REA), the Geothermal Development Corporation (GDC), 
the independent regulator Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) and 
the Energy Tribunal that would hear appeals from decisions of  the 
ERC. The GDC is fully owned by the state, and carries geothermal 
exploration, drilling, and sale of  steam to generators. The REA 
implements the (subsidised) rural electrification programme. At the top 
of  this institutional framework, the Ministry of  Energy and Petroleum 
(MoEP) defines energy policy and is responsible for overall planning.
The Energy Bill 2015 considers new challenges and opportunities for 
the energy sector, arising from the discovery of  domestic fossil fuels 
and the political decentralisation of  the country. The new Energy 
Bill defines the distribution of  functions between national and county 
governments. Functions of  county governments include the development 
of  a county energy plan; the provision of  land and rights of  way for 
energy infrastructure; the facilitation of  energy demand by planning 
for industrial parks and other energy‑consuming activities; and the 
enforcement provisions for efficient use of  energy and its conservation.
Other policies and regulations relevant for the renewable energy sector 
include the Least Cost Power Development Plans (LCPDPs), the Feed‑in 
Tariff (FiT) policy and the Energy Local Content Regulations. The 
LCPDPs are prepared by the MoEP through inter‑ministerial and 
industry consultations and with support from international consultancies. 
They include electricity demand forecasts, an assessment of  energy 
resources, and expansion plans for generation and transmission capacity. 
They provide recommendations on a range of  investment options, 
mainly taking into account their cost through the life cycle of  projects, 
measured through the levelised cost of  electricity (LCOE).
The Government of  Kenya introduced feed-in tariffs in 2008 (revised in 
2010 and 2012) to promote private investment in renewable energy by 
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providing a secure long‑term price and guaranteed access to the grid. 
The tariffs apply to grid-connected plants and are valid for a 20-year 
period from the beginning of  the power purchasing agreement (PPA), 
with approval of  the PPAs granted by the ERC. The FiT policy provides 
electricity purchase guarantees by the main power utility KPLC and 
includes all power generation categories.
The 2014 Energy Local Content Regulations require that companies 
operating in the energy sector submit a local content plan when 
applying for a licence. The local content plan would need to give first 
consideration to Kenyan services, products, and employees and commit 
to train Kenyans on the job. They also set minimum local content 
requirements for energy operations in the country, with levels increasing 
from the start of  the project to 75 per cent of  the duration of  the 
project to reach 80 per cent of  goods and services, 70–80 per cent of  
management and technical core staff, and 100 per cent of  other staff.
We now discuss the roles of  different stakeholders in the power sector. 
In addition to the national government stakeholders mentioned when 
describing the 2006 Energy Act, international governments, operating 
through their development agencies, play a significant role in Kenya’s 
power sector. Donors are responsible for funding a large share of  
generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure and are able to 
influence energy policy through their technical advisers and the conditions 
set for concessional finance. The MoEP chairs a donor coordination 
group to define support priorities. Some examples of  contributions by 
donors to Kenya’s energy sector are as follows (Tierney et al. 2011):
 l The World Bank funded the Energy Sector Reform in 1997 and 
more recently the Kenya Electricity Expansion Project that includes 
projects in generation, transmission, and distribution.
 l Japan has funded several power generation plants, including 
hydropower, diesel generation, and geothermal.
 l France has funded transmission lines between Mombasa and Nairobi 
and grid extension in rural areas.
 l Germany has provided equipment for the Olkaria geothermal power 
plant.
 l Spain has funded a 430km transmission line for the Lake Turkana 
wind power plant, as well as rural electrification projects.
 l The United Kingdom (through the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation) funded a share of  the thermal Tsavo power plant 
and, lately through the Department for International Development 
(DFID), has provided funds for project preparation of  green 
mini‑grids and leveraging private investment.
 l The African Development Bank (AfDB) has funded a transmission 
system improvement project as well as regional interconnections with 
Uganda and Ethiopia.
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Table 1 Kenya renewable energy sector stakeholders map
Stakeholder/arenas International National Local/county
Government World Bank
African Development Bank 
(AfDB)
East Africa Power Pool (EAPP)
Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA)
Department for International 
Development of the UK (DFID)
Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA)
US Agency for International 
Development (USAID)
French Development Agency 
(AFD)
European Commission 
International Cooperation and 
Development (DG DEVCO)
Power Africa
European Investment Bank (EIB)
Ministry of Energy and 
Petroleum (MoEP)
Ministry of Environment and 
Mineral Resources (MoENR)
The National Treasury (TNT)
Ministry of Devolution and 
Planning (MoDP)
Ministry of Water and Irrigation 
(MoWI)
Rural Electrification Agency 
(REA)
Energy Regulatory Commission 
(ERC)
Kenya Investment Authority 
(KENINVEST)
County government
County ministries of energy
Business (both private 
and state-owned)
Commercial banks
Equity investors (i.e. Aldwych 
International)
International IPPs (i.e. Lake 
Turkana Wind Power, Thika, 
Rabai, Orpower, Tsavo)
Engineering, procurement, and 
construction (EPC) contractors
RE technology manufacturers
Private mini-grid developers 
(e.g. Powerhive, Powergen, 
SteamaCo)
Private sellers of solar home 
systems (SHS) (e.g. BBOX, 
M-KOPA)
KENGEN
KETRACO
GDC
Kenya Power
KEREA
KAM
KEPSA
Local equity investors
Local IPPs
Kenya Bankers’ Association
Civil society WWF
CAFOD
Practical Action
International universities
Nature Kenya
Consumer Federation of Kenya 
(COFEK)
National education institutions 
(e.g. Stanmore University, 
University of Nairobi)
Residential consumers
Agricultural cooperatives
Pastoral groups
Women’s groups
Youth groups
Source Authors’ own.
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The private sector is another important player in Kenya’s power 
sector. As of  May 2016, there were 11 IPPs in Kenya, including 
Iberafrica, Tsavo, OrPower 4, Rabai, Thika, Imenti, Power Technology 
Solutions, Gulf, Triumph, Mumias, and Aggreko (as emergency power 
producer). Collectively, they accounted for about one third of  the 
country’s installed capacity, predominantly from thermal but also from 
renewable sources: geothermal, small hydro and bagasse. Further IPP 
generation projects are in the pipeline, most notably in the wind sector. 
IPPs are dominated by foreign investors, due to a lack of  domestic 
equity for large infrastructure projects (Pueyo et al. 2017). At a smaller 
scale, several private companies operate in the off-grid market, either 
selling solar products (solar home systems or solar lanterns) or setting 
up mini‑grids. Kenya is in fact the African country with the largest 
number of  solar home systems installed as well as the largest number of  
enterprises providing ‘pay‑as‑you‑go’ solar power (REN21 2016).
The local private sector in the renewable energy sector is represented by 
the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), the Kenya Association of  
Manufacturers (KAM), and the Kenya Renewable Energy Association 
(KEREA). Whereas KEREA mainly represents the small‑scale solar 
industry, KEPSA and KAM represent a broader range of  larger and 
more powerful businesses. Contradictions arise in these groups between 
businesses involved in the RE generation sector, seeking higher tariffs for 
renewable energy, and businesses as electricity consumers putting pressure 
on the government to further reduce electricity prices (Newell et al. 2014).
The Kenyan electricity system is skewed towards industrial and urban 
consumers. Large commercial and industrial customers represent 
54 per cent of  the national electricity sales but only 0.1 per cent of  the 
total connections. On the other side, domestic consumers represent 90 per 
cent of  the connections but only 25 per cent of  the sales of  electricity. 
Geographically, 52 per cent of  electricity sales are in the Nairobi area 
(Kenya Power 2014). Industrial and urban consumers are therefore the most 
powerful actors in pressuring the government to keep electricity tariffs low.
Finally, civil society is highly influential in Kenya and is considered 
one of  ‘Africa’s bravest and most vocal’, contributing for example 
to facilitating justice and peaceful coexistence after the 2007–08 
post‑election violence (Allison 2016). Numerous non‑governmental 
organisations (NGOs) operate in the country, pursuing environmental 
protection and poverty reduction. National and international 
universities are also involved in the renewable energy (RE) sector as 
developers of  off-grid generation projects. All these stakeholders are 
presented in Table 1, classified according to their sector (public, private, 
civil society) and geographic reach (national, international, local).
3 Low rural demand and inappropriate planning
3.1 Constraints
In this section, we look more in depth at one of  the key constraints to 
further investment in renewables in Kenya identified in Pueyo et al. (2017). 
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It refers to low rural demand and an inadequate rural electrification 
model that favours grid extension and large centralised generation.
Low levels of  demand are due to high poverty rates (higher than the average 
in sub‑Saharan Africa) and a lack of  productive uses. According to data from 
a private company operating mini‑grids in the country, the average monthly 
electricity consumption of  their rural consumers is just 5KWh, compared 
to more than 200KWh in Nairobi. Most households do not have sufficient 
disposable income to acquire modern electrical appliances and use electricity 
for basic lighting and powering radios and TVs.2
The political origins of  rural poverty draw on one side from 
marginalisation, or skewed allocation of  resources for development. In 
Kenya, the regions with political representation in government tend to 
draw more economic benefits as they are prioritised for development plans. 
Development efforts have been concentrated in the past in the capital cities 
and a number of  larger towns following closely the Mombasa–Kisumu 
railway network and its branches. Kenya’s grid extension map is a clear 
pointer of  how resources have been allocated historically. On the other 
side, Kenya’s rural lands are generally unproductive, with some 80 per 
cent of  the territory considered arid or semi‑arid and few mineral deposits 
(Barnett 2016). Traditionally, these unproductive regions have been treated 
with less priority by the political class.
The political preference for a rural electrification model based on 
centralised power generation and grid extension arises as Kenyan 
politicians do not consider decentralised solar power as ‘total 
electricity’,3 due to its lower capacity as compared to grid power. Several 
rural household surveys in Africa also show a higher willingness to pay 
for grid electricity than for off-grid solutions, even when consumption 
levels are low (Peters and Sievert 2016). Accordingly, the current 
president has supported wholeheartedly the development of  large‑scale 
geothermal power, as it can provide baseload power at very low costs. 
This allocation of  priorities has displaced funds for other renewable 
energy technologies, especially as donors seek to be aligned with the 
country’s development strategy.
Customers served by Kenya Power through the grid or mini‑grids 
benefit from cross-subsidies for consumption tariffs, but must still pay 
a high fee to cover the costs of  connection. This keeps connection 
rates low even for those households within reach of  the grid (Lee et al. 
2016). Grid extension to rural areas that are not able to pay for it places 
a heavy financial burden on Kenya’s distribution utility and creates 
tension between the goals of  universal access to electricity and financial 
sustainability of  the power supply system.
Private off-grid alternatives providing solar home systems or solar 
lanterns through pay‑as‑you‑go business models have been very 
successful in addressing upfront capital barriers. In this case, power 
suppliers also become financiers of  the final consumers through a model 
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in which they pay for the capital cost of  systems and customers pay back 
in instalments. Access to working capital is then essential for suppliers, 
but it is expensive and hard to get in risky markets, which inevitably 
increases the price for final consumers.
Solar mini‑grids with higher installed capacities allow a wider diversity 
of  electricity uses, comparable to those provided by the national grid. 
However, when they are not subsidised, they are considered too expensive 
for most of  the rural population and can only target relatively wealthy 
households and commercial establishments (Carbon Africa et al. 2015). 
Besides, they confront the risk of  being crowded out by the cheaper tariffs 
of  the national grid if  it reaches a village before mini‑grid operators 
are able to get a return on their investment. There has been a lot of  
uncertainty about when the grid would be expected to arrive to different 
regions in Kenya and what would be the fate of  private mini‑grids.
3.2 Policies to address low demand constraints
Three policies could contribute to address the mismatch between low 
electricity demand in rural areas and a rural electrification model 
based on grid extension, which requires a minimum consumption to be 
financially sustainable:
1 Increasing rural demand through integrated development 
programmes that enhance the productive potential of  rural areas;
2 Adapting supply alternatives to the low rural demand through 
integrated planning of  grid extension and off-grid solutions;
3 Increasing the ability to pay of  poor rural consumers through subsidies.
First, we discuss development programmes to increase demand for 
electricity ahead or in parallel to electrification. The imbalance 
between urban and rural areas has long been recognised in Kenya. 
The development plan of  1965–70 targeted sectoral development in 
rural areas to address this problem. However, redistribution goals were 
not realised as interventions targeted the areas with the best productive 
potential. The more recent Vision 2030 is currently implementing 
Medium Term Plan II (2013 to 2017) in order to deliver accelerated 
and inclusive economic growth, higher living standards, better 
education and health care, increased job creation especially for the 
youth, commercialised agriculture, an improved manufacturing sector, 
and more diversified exports (Government of  Kenya 2007).
Secondly, on integrated planning, the current generation and 
transmission master plan (2015–35) highlights the importance of  off-grid 
electrification in rural areas to supplement the national grid while 
progressing towards universal electrification (Lahmeyer International 
2016). Several donor initiatives also point at the increasing importance 
of  mini-grids for electrification, such as the proposed World Bank Kenya 
Off-Grid Solar Access for Underserved Communities, or DFID’s green 
mini‑grids facility. The MoEP has commissioned a study to inform 
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mini‑grid regulations and business models for the private sector. This 
study develops a clear framework for the obligations of  Kenya Power 
when the grid reaches a village with a private mini‑grid.4 The ministry 
is also developing a national electrification strategy where geo-spatial 
mapping will be used to inform areas, resources, and strategies for 
electrification by grid, mini-grid, and any other distributed energy. An 
additional trend towards planning from the bottom‑up comes from the 
2015 Energy Bill that requires each county to draw up its energy plan. 
This will require closer collaboration between national and county 
governments, as well as capacity building at the county level. However, 
some stakeholders are critical of  the benefits of  devolution for energy 
planning, citing that it creates a new layer of  transaction costs for 
investors and can further delay projects due to competition for political 
power between Members of  Parliament (MPs) and county governments.5
Thirdly, on the introduction of  subsidies for poor consumers, there are 
three types of  subsidies commonly used to address the electrification 
gap: subsidies to cover capital costs of  grid extension or off-grid systems; 
subsidies to cover connection costs; and cross-subsidies, where lower tariffs 
for some particular types of  consumers are financed by increasing charges 
to other customers or regions (World Bank 2010). Kenya is currently using 
all three types. The capital costs of  grid extension are usually financed 
with donor grants or concessional loans. Several programmes are in 
place to cover or finance the connection costs of  the poor. For example, 
the Last Mile Connectivity project, jointly funded by the World Bank, 
subsidises connections for households within reach of  the grid, mainly 
in urban slums. Kenya Power also provides credit to potential customers 
who require financing to pay for their connection fees. Cross-subsidies 
are in place through a lifeline tariff for low consumption households of  
up to 50KWh per month, and a uniform tariff policy through which 
urban consumers effectively subsidise the more expensive to reach rural 
consumers. However, given the very low rural electrification rate, the 
scale of  this transfer is very low. Cross‑subsidies have in fact proved to be 
very effective in financing rural electrification in middle-income countries 
that had reached a critical mass of  urban connections. However, in much 
of  sub‑Saharan Africa, and Kenya in particular, providing rural access 
through cross‑subsidies would involve highly contested price increases for 
urban and industrial consumers.
Donors are increasingly supporting the idea of  a market‑led, unsubsidised 
market for solar photovoltaic (PV) and this seems corroborated by the 
success of  the Kenyan solar PV market. However, this ‘unsubsidised’ 
market has relied heavily on donor support to provide seed capital for 
private entrepreneurs, to enable learning and to create markets (Ockwell 
and Byrne 2016). This private sector‑led narrative has ‘ironically been a 
powerful tool to attract resources from donors to subsidise development 
that has supported the activities of  private sector actors’ (ibid.: 73).
We find, therefore, that both the subsidies-led and market-led approaches 
for the provision of  electricity to the poor in Kenya depend heavily on 
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donor support. However, the dominance of  one model over the other 
results in a very different distribution of  benefits. Subsidy-based approaches 
confer more power to the national utility and hence are prone to lobbying 
and rent-seeking. Profit-driven approaches could give opportunities for 
certain actors to gain excessive rents at the expense of  the poorest. This is 
already the case in Kenya, where some rural consumers can pay ten times 
the national tariff for electricity supplied by private mini-grids (Pueyo 2015).
4 High system costs
4.1 Constraints
The second constraint we look at in more detail refers to high system 
costs, due to transmission and distribution infrastructure needs and to 
the balancing costs of  intermittent renewables. Kenya has long suffered 
from a weak power transmission and distribution infrastructure, due to 
insufficient investments in upgrading the system (Sessional Paper 4 on 
Energy 2004, Government of  Kenya 2004). A large share of  system 
losses, outages, and voltage fluctuations are due to the poor state of  
the distribution network (Parsons Brinckerhoff 2013). Besides, Kenya’s 
electrical network faces new challenges, including the long distance 
between some renewable energy generation resources and demand 
centres; the goal of  universal electrification; and the growing share of  
intermittent generation, mainly from wind power plants (Lahmeyer 
International 2016). All these are likely to increase costs for final 
consumers.
We discuss firstly the need to invest in transmission and distribution 
infrastructure. The responsibility for developing the national grid 
lies with the government. Investment needs are detailed in a 20‑year 
Power Generation and Distribution Master Plan, which is periodically 
updated. The power evacuation plans are informed by the Least Cost 
Power Development Plan (LCPDP) which defines the generation 
projects using a long‑term trajectory.
After years of  neglect, Kenya’s grid is currently undergoing a major 
expansion, driven by demand growth and the increasing importance 
of  energy for international donors. Funding for new transmission 
and distribution capacity comes from three sources: retained earnings 
of  the transmission and distribution utilities; the national budget; 
and long‑term loans at concessional rates, mainly from international 
development banks.
Transmission and distribution charges are calculated and approved by 
the ERC on the basis of  performance targets (2004 Sessional Paper 
on Energy, Government of  Kenya 2004). However, most transmission 
projects utilise treasury and external funding, with only one transmission 
line funded internally by KETRACO.6 The government’s funding of  
transmission projects usually focus on local costs, such as the acquisition 
of  wayleaves (right of  way for transmission lines), land for substations, 
and consultancy costs, whereas external partners fund infrastructure 
costs. The national budget has traditionally marginalised investments in 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 5–6 November 2017: ‘Green Power for Africa: Overcoming the Main Constraints’ 119–140 | 129
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
the country’s electricity network, as opposed to other, more visible items 
in the infrastructure budget line, mainly roads.7 However, the grid is 
receiving increased internal and external political support. For example, 
the African Development Bank (AfDB), the French Development 
Agency (AFD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) are behind 
the Last Mile Connectivity Project. The World Bank has financed 
an informal settlements electrification programme and the Kenya 
Electricity Modernisation Project (jointly with AFD), that improved the 
efficiency of  the distribution network. Other donors, particularly the 
UK, are increasingly focusing their support on private sector-led off-grid 
alternatives.
The second element increasing system costs is the increased penetration 
of  variable renewables, mainly wind. However, another article in this 
IDS Bulletin, by Edwards, Dent and Wade, demonstrates that the large 
wind projects currently being built in Kenya are likely to contribute 
significantly to generation adequacy of  the system, thanks to the 
complementarity between the wind resource and demand, and between 
wind and hydro resources. In any case, large‑scale, remote intermittent 
renewable generation can carry significant risks for the country, as 
exemplified by the 310MW Lake Turkana Wind Power (LTWP) plant. 
Two particular clauses in the PPA signed in August 2014 between the 
project owners and the off-taker, Kenya Power,8 place a strong burden 
on the Kenyan counterparty. First, a monthly fine to be paid to the 
owners of  the project in case transmission lines are not completed in 
time (Standard Digital 2017). Second, a ‘take‑or‑pay’ clause committing 
Kenya Power to purchase all the power generated by the wind power 
plant. This is problematic because wind power may be generated at 
times when demand in Kenya is low (e.g. at night) and when there 
is not enough transmission capacity. To honour this clause, Kenya 
Power has ring‑fenced an account funded through higher power bills 
for consumers. This account, managed by the Treasury and the ERC, 
is considered crucial for maintaining Kenya’s profile as a renewable 
investment destination (Business Daily 2017).
The transmission line for the LTWP is now years late, after severe 
delays to ensure wayleaves and financial problems of  the EPC 
contractor (ESI Africa 2017). The government therefore faces the 
prospect of  having to pay a large fine to the project owners. Whereas 
PPAs aim at placing the risk on the counterparty more able to deal with 
it, it is questionable that a country with high levels of  poverty and very 
low electrification rates should transfer to consumers the cost of  a risky 
private investment decision.
4.2 Policies to address high system costs
Several policies and measures could address the system constraints 
previously identified:
 l Prioritise transmission and distribution infrastructure in the national 
budget, to address chronic underinvestment;
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 l Consider transmission and distribution (T&D) risks in new RE 
contracts, to limit the exposure of  the national utility to these risks;
 l Introduce flexibility in the system, to address the intermittency of  
wind and solar generation;
 l Increase capabilities to manage the increasing shares of  intermittent 
generation in the system.
The first measure proposed involves prioritising transmission and 
distribution infrastructure over other infrastructure‑related projects. 
Our interview with a representative from KETRACO reveals that 
the background of  key officials at the MoEP has an influence on 
the types of  energy infrastructure that get prioritised. For example, 
the appointment of  a Principal Secretary (PS) at the MoEP with 
an engineering background has played a part in recent increased 
investments in the transmission grid as compared to the previous PS, 
who was an economist.9 KETRACO assesses the grid reinforcements 
that are required and prepares a concept note channelled via the 
MoEP for cabinet approval, after which development funding is sought 
alongside treasury funding. The PS then acts as the gatekeeper for all 
investment demands of  the state energy agencies.10
The second measure proposed requires that the selection of  sites for the 
location of  renewable energy generation takes into account the risks 
related to T&D infrastructure. For example, transmission charges to 
generators should be location-specific, instead of  the typical uniform 
rate to all network users. Locational transmission charges send the right 
economic signals to the market players, enabling the market to operate 
properly with respect to losses and possible grid connection as well as 
in the long term, encouraging future players to choose their locations 
accordingly. Nodal prices, defined as the price paid or received for the 
energy consumed or generated by a growth in demand, are commonly 
used in South American countries with long transmission distances such 
as Chile, Argentina, and Peru. Single pricing is the most commonly used 
approach in the world, but it is inefficient when the location of  power 
generation plants has a significant impact on network costs, like in the case 
of  renewable megaprojects located far from demand (Pérez‑Arriaga 2013).
The government could also de‑risk sites before power generation 
plants are procured, by building transmission lines before the plants 
are built. In this case, a centralised generation and transmission 
plan would define the optimal siting of  generation plants taking 
into account the transmission costs. The selected sites would then 
be opened to public tender or renewable energy auctions, once the 
transmission infrastructure is in place. This would delay cost recovery 
for transmission infrastructure, which could be addressed through grace 
periods in the financing conditions of  external donors. Some additional 
policies could be used to incentivise investors to site at convenient places 
from the transmission network viewpoint.
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The third measure involves introducing further flexibility to the Kenyan 
system by, for example, increasing reserve capacity from hydro, gas, 
medium speed diesel, or flexible interconnections with neighbouring 
countries. A flexible interconnection with Ethiopia providing access 
to their large hydropower generation would be a low‑cost, low‑carbon 
option to provide flexibility to the Kenyan system. However, dependence 
on electricity generated in another country has political implications, 
‘providing one country with political power over another, involving 
countries in each other’s internal affairs, creating opportunities for 
corruption, creating political costs in protecting the line, and creating 
political costs in the process of  tariff rationalisation’ (Barnett 2014: 19).
The final measure proposed involves capacity building for the system 
operator to be able to balance a system with a high penetration of  
renewables. Some programmes are in place to deal with this, such as 
Power Africa’s Grid Management Support Programme (GMSP).11 
The government has also agreed on local content regulations for 
energy projects to enhance local capabilities. However, a key element 
is learning‑by‑doing, which requires time and the gradual building 
of  renewable energy capacity. The sudden increase in intermittent 
generation from nearly negligible to around 15 per cent of  capacity with 
the LTWP project will make this hard for the Kenyan system operator.
5 Social acceptance and access to land
5.1 Constraints
We finally focus on social acceptance issues, as they have proved to be the 
most important stumbling block for several renewable energy projects. For 
example, Olkaria geothermal plants faced court cases and had to disburse 
significant amounts in resettlement programmes for the local population. 
Kinangop wind power plant, which would have been the first private 
wind power plant using FiT had to be abandoned after local protests 
caused serious disruptions. The LTWP has also faced a court case about 
illegal land acquisition and has experienced significant delays due to the 
difficulty in obtaining wayleaves for a transmission line. The delay may be 
costly for the Kenyan government, as it is liable to compensate developers 
for the power they cannot sell once the plant is ready to start operations.
Social acceptance is intrinsically related to access to land, as the local 
population contests the right of  private and government developers 
to use the land where they live or work. Issues of  compensation and 
consultation are further complicated when the current users of  the 
land do not hold formal titles, as is often the case in Kenya. The lack of  
clarity over land rights also creates the possibility of  rent‑seeking from 
local communities seeking compensation for land not used by them.
Previous research suggests that communities are more favourable to 
projects when they are given full information about their costs and 
benefits, when benefit-sharing mechanisms are in place, and when 
they are involved in consultation and decision‑making (Wüstenhagen, 
Wolsink and Bürer 2007).
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Our research in Kenya shows that the underlying causes for the 
problems of  social acceptance and access to land are:
 l Lack of  clarity about land value, land property rights, and the land 
acquisition process;
 l Imbalance between the costs and benefits for local communities 
(where infrastructure is located), urban residents (getting the service), 
and investors (profiting from it);
 l Lack of  clarity about consultation and compensation processes;
 l Interference of  local politicians seeking political or financial gain 
from the projects.
We discuss each of  these causes in more detail, starting with access to 
land. There are three land ownership categories in Kenya: private land, 
public land, and community land.12 Community land poses the greatest 
challenge for land acquisition, because it is not clear who holds rights 
over it. Public land on the other hand is not readily available and is 
often governed under conservation and environmental legislation that 
limits its development. There are also limitations to purchase private 
land, as foreign companies are not allowed to buy agricultural land in 
Kenya. Private investors can get around this limitation by forming a joint 
company with locals, but this introduces additional risks.13 Generally, 
purchasing land is much harder than gaining the right to use the land for 
a defined purpose and timeframe through a leasing contract.14
The process of  accessing land is mainly guided by the Constitution 
and the Land Act 2012. After the new 2010 Constitution, the devolved 
government holds public land in trust on behalf  of  the residents, and 
the national utilities have to apply to the National Land Commission 
for approval of  valuation of  land as quoted in the Land Act 2012. Such 
valuation is advertised for any public objections and if  protested, may lead 
the process into re‑valuation.15 By introducing a new layer of  government 
for land acquisition transactions, the Constitution has increased transaction 
costs and timeframes for project development and implementation.16 An 
additional problem related to land acquisition comes from the lack of  
protection against speculation with land prices. When landowners and 
communities realise that the land is sought for use in electricity generation, 
prices escalate. Middlemen and political brokers insist on negotiating the 
price with land buyers and can use a number of  tactics to increase the 
price, such as encouraging locals to settle in the proposed sites before or 
even after the transaction is completed, and demanding compensation.17 
Land cartels are also a known phenomenon, where landowners collude to 
increase prices for wayleaves and generation project sites.18
The second issue is the imbalance between the costs for local 
communities where infrastructures are placed and the benefits for the 
population getting electricity. Project developers may put in place social 
responsibility programmes including schools, new houses, or other social 
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services, or also give monetary compensation, but demands from local 
communities often exceed what project developers are ready to offer.19 
Another source of  grievance is the arrival of  outsiders to work on the 
projects and the lack of  jobs for the local population. In this respect, 
project developers claim that locals lack the necessary qualifications to 
carry out the job to an acceptable standard.20
The third issue is the lack of  clear consultation and compensation 
guidelines. Project developers find it difficult to engage meaningfully 
with communities. They often struggle to differentiate legitimate 
from illegitimate demands for compensation and there has been no 
guidance on the acceptable level of  this compensation. Speculation, 
encroachment, and settlement on lands demarcated for energy projects 
can sharply increase the cost of  compensation for land since the 
origination of  the project.21 Several interviewees indicated that early 
consultations with local project stakeholders are a key element of  
success. When local communities and politicians are given the chance 
to provide inputs to the design of  the project they are more likely to 
accept it later on. The LTWP provides an example of  successful early 
consultation with environmentalists and the local population, which 
led to a change of  location from close to Lake Turkana to Marsabit, to 
minimise damage to local birds.22 On the other hand, environmentalists 
were not successful in deterring geothermal exploration around Hells 
Gate National Park, host to globally endangered species.
The final issue is the involvement of  local politicians for political or 
financial gain from RE projects. The 2010 Constitution has introduced 
a new layer of  political competition, and many expectations from 
locals about what the county administration can achieve for them. 
For example, with devolution came expectations that counties would 
get free electricity for their citizens.23 The county administration can 
demand this, as well as jobs or shares in RE companies, and influence 
the acceptability of  a project by locals if  these are not granted.24 The 
fate of  Kinangop reflects the consequences of  partnering with the 
‘wrong’ politicians. In this case, project developers partnered with 
an ex‑MP, who was a competitor of  the local MP. Fearing that the 
success of  the project would be a political gain for his competitor, 
the local MP mobilised community members to demonstrate against 
the project. Fake claims were spread about the project, including 
links between wind energy and infertility and unbearable noise levels. 
Demands for compensation and protests escalated until the project had 
to be abandoned. Kinangop is now seeking compensation from the 
government for the costs it incurred in project preparation.
5.2 Policies to address social opposition
The four constraints described previously can be addressed through four 
types of  policies. First, land use policies that clarify who holds property 
rights for the land and who can purchase it; second, clear consultation 
and compensation guidelines that reduce uncertainty for both investors 
and communities; third, active participation of  communities in 
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management processes; and finally, anti-corruption measures to limit 
the opportunities for politicians to gain personally from projects.
Firstly, Kenya has traditionally operated without a clearly defined land 
use policy, with many uncoordinated institutions and pieces of  legislation 
dealing with land use management. The government is currently 
developing a draft national land use policy that sets a common framework 
for the optimal utilisation of  land resources, taking into account the goals 
of  productivity and sustainability. Additionally, to reduce uncertainty 
around communal land, the recent Community Land Act 2016 provides 
for recognition and protection of  community land rights. It requires 
that community lands are mapped, planned, and registered, making it 
simple for communities to apply for formal land titles without having to 
register as a legal entity. It also sets that all members of  the community 
are allowed to benefit from it and that decision-making power with regard 
to the land is vested in a community assembly. County governments will 
hold in trust all unregistered community land on behalf  of  the respective 
communities. There are, however, two key challenges with this legislation: 
first, the low quorum required for decision-making in communities could 
be abused by elites and marginalise a large section of  those communities. 
Second, the law is not clear on how to fairly allocate rights over land used 
by several communities.
Secondly, progress is also being made with regard to clearer consultation 
guidelines. County public participation guidelines initiated by the 
Ministry of  Devolution and Planning inform public participation 
practice in county governments, in line with the County Government 
Act 2012. They set the approach to actively engage the public in 
policymaking, planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring, and 
evaluation. However, these do not contemplate consultations by private 
investors. Private investors often follow international standards of  social 
consultation that require free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) from 
indigenous communities. The most widely followed standards are set 
by the International Financial Corporation (IFC) and the Equator 
Principles25 and are required by multilateral development banks and 
export credit agencies as a precondition for funding.
Two recent policies aim at providing further clarity on compensation 
and land prices. The Amended 2016 Land Act introduces a bill that sets 
a cap on compensations required for the use of  land for public purposes 
and limits the power held by property owners in this respect. The 
amendment also prohibits unlawful occupation of  private, community, 
or public land and sets a procedure for eviction. On the other hand, 
the National Land Value Index (amendment) Bill 2016 seeks to create 
a national reference point for land values, which would help the 
government, investors, and landowners negotiate compensation and 
resist speculation. The bill also proposes that once land is officially taken 
and funds committed by the National Land Commission, development 
cannot be stopped by any court. Landowners can receive a monetary 
compensation, land swaps, or government bonds in return.
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The previously mentioned local content regulations seek further 
community involvement, requiring that energy projects employ and train 
national Kenyans. However, there are no requirements that beneficiaries 
are from the local communities where the projects are located.
In spite of  these recent developments, Kenya still lacks an explicit 
policy framework that details benefit-sharing mechanisms (BSMs) and 
community participation in management processes, both considered 
essential in the literature on the social acceptance of  renewables 
(Hammami, Chtourou and Triki 2015). Compensation for communities 
should be based on independent analyses showing the distribution of  
costs and benefits among the different interest groups. Some frequently 
used BSMs include sharing revenues with the local community, creating 
local jobs, preferential electricity tariffs, building roads, or investing in 
other public services such as schools or health centres. Some of  these 
activities are carried ad hoc by energy projects, but without following 
a systematic approach. On the other hand, community participation 
needs to take place from the project conception and all the way through 
its operation, using transparent and participatory processes (ibid.; Shinke 
and Klawitter 2015).
6 Discussion: the politics of removing constraints to investment in 
renewable energy
Kenya has been hailed as one of  the most successful African countries 
in attracting renewable energy investment. However, many barriers 
persist that endanger the goal of  universal access to clean, reliable, 
and affordable energy by 2030. Three particular constraints stand out: 
the inadequacy of  generation, transmission, and distribution planning 
practices for the low rural demand; the high system costs; and strong 
social opposition to large‑scale infrastructure, including renewable 
energy. The first two problems are shared in many other African 
countries and the last one is particularly acute in Kenya. This article 
has tried to better understand the factors that underlie these three 
constraints by looking at how they emerged, and what are the policies 
that can address them. In this section, we discuss the actors that could 
drive or oppose the implementation of  these policies and we conclude 
by underscoring the role of  the state.
At the heart of  Kenya’s problems there is a large pool of  unmet needs 
and competition for scarce resources dominated by the ruling elite. As 
noted in Ng’ethe, Katumanga and Williams, ‘[T]he elite have generally 
opposed pro‑poor change where this threatens their interests and 
sources of  patronage’ (2004: 4). However, ‘[I]n the past, reforms have 
usually occurred when the elite has come under sustained pressure from 
interest groups’ (as cited in Barnett 2016: session 5, page 3). Whereas 
the supply of  electricity has traditionally focused on large industrial 
customers and the urban population, increased pressure to provide 
access for all is now coming jointly from the international development 
community and the local devolved government. International donors 
provide finance and technical assistance, while local governments seek 
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to provide basic services to their population and can contribute to the 
social acceptance of  infrastructure projects. Between these two actors 
there are two powerful national institutions acting as gatekeepers for the 
allocation of  funding priorities: the National Treasury and the MoEP.
International development institutions seek poverty eradication and 
increasing convergence with the welfare levels of  developed countries, 
while keeping developing countries’ debt under control. They increasingly 
follow a private sector‑led narrative, where funds are provided strategically 
to mobilise a larger share of  private finance (Pueyo, Orraca and 
Godfrey‑Woods 2015). There is still a general perception of  state‑owned 
enterprises as being inefficient and corrupt, whereas private entrepreneurs 
represent efficiency through their profit-seeking behaviour and 
competition. Under this profit-driven approach, natural monopolies such 
as the network components of  the electricity system, and non-profitable 
segments such as rural electrification often fall between the cracks.
The National Treasury and the MoEP of  Kenya are driven by a 
growth imperative. They support investment in least‑cost generation 
and increased energy efficiency, as these contribute to the ambitious 
economic growth targets set up in the Vision 2030 strategy. The 
least-cost narrative is very much influenced by large industry, which is 
the main electricity consumer.
The devolved governments, on the other hand, seek to transfer 
central funds to their localities, to improve development outcomes of  
their often‑neglected communities. They are likely to oppose large 
infrastructure projects geared towards urban areas when their counties 
bear the costs but reap none of  the benefits. Civil society seeks equal 
access to energy services, and compensation for the economic, social, or 
environmental costs of  large infrastructure located in their native land.
The different interests of  these actors can align in some specific policies. 
For example, policies to increase the productivity of  rural areas heavily 
dependent on agriculture could increase rural incomes and therefore 
the ability to pay for electricity connections and consumption. At 
the same time, energy interventions could contribute to increase 
rural productivity through, for example, irrigation systems, and 
the mechanisation of  agriculture, the development of  agricultural 
processing, and other non‑farm activities. A larger rural demand would 
improve the financial viability of  public grid extension programmes or 
private mini‑grids and reduce the cost per unit of  electricity for all rural 
consumers. Such an approach requires close collaboration between 
energy planners making decisions about the most appropriate energy 
supply technology, and rural development planners influencing the size 
and composition of  the rural demand. The dialogue between supply 
and demand should reflect on bottom-up rural electrification plans 
that take into account the location of  customers and their current and 
prospective demand on the basis of  realistic development opportunities. 
Kenya is taking steps in that direction through the increased role of  the 
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devolved government in energy planning and new rural electrification 
planning initiatives using geographic information.
In other cases, actors’ interests clash; for example, when final consumers 
are asked to pay for the risks taken by private developers (like the 
LTWP) or for the cost of  rural electrification through new items in 
their electricity bill. In the first case, support follows the narrative that 
Kenya needs to maintain its status as a desirable destination for private 
sector investment by keeping risks low for investors. The second case 
follows an energy justice narrative, where the poorer should not be 
made to pay more for basic services than the wealthier, even if  they 
are more expensive to reach. The interests of  local communities and 
large industrial and urban consumers also clash when large renewable 
energy infrastructure located in rural areas feeds power directly to the 
transmission system heading to Nairobi.
The international development community is trying to make the 
narratives of  energy justice and private sector‑led development 
converge through the promotion of  private mini‑grids. For example, 
the DFID‑funded Green Mini‑Grid Facility (GMF) was announced in 
March 2017 to provide investment grants and technical assistance to 
leverage private investment in mini‑grids in Kenya. It is certainly an 
attractive narrative that private entrepreneurs could target the poorest 
populations by offering them an affordable service that they are able to 
pay for. However, the prices that these mini‑grids can achieve are still 
significantly higher than those paid by those connected to the national 
grid and are only affordable to a small share of  the rural population 
(Carbon Africa et al. 2015). The cost of  finance faced by small 
entrepreneurs is also much higher than that enjoyed by state‑owned 
enterprises, and economies of  scale will not materialise without 
common standards for grid compatibility of  mini‑grids.
To conclude, Kenya’s goal of  sustainable electricity for all requires a set 
of  actors with conflicting interests to align their position. Donors’ pressure 
towards decentralised, private sector-led electrification needs to align with 
the national government’s preference towards large‑scale, centralised 
generation, as this could generate the funds required to cross‑subsidise 
poor and remote consumers. The dichotomy between private versus 
public-led electrification also needs to be solved. Private developers selling 
to the grid require access to the network elements of  the system. On the 
other hand, private off-grid supply could be easily crowded out by the 
national grid offering electricity at a fraction of  the price.
A fine balance is hence required to maintain the remarkable (and recent) 
financial sustainability of  the Kenyan power sector. The independence 
of  the regulator and the national distribution company are key to achieve 
this. The state and international donors have a crucial role in allocating 
funds to members of  society less able to afford the full cost of  electricity 
and to the natural monopolies of  transmission and distribution. Public 
actors should also support structural transformation, increasing the 
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productivity of  the agricultural sector until rural areas are able to pay for 
the full cost of  electrification. While demand remains low in rural areas, 
the private sector will keep focusing on the most profitable segments 
of  the market, whether large‑scale generation to supply industry and 
urban households connected to the grid, or small‑scale solutions for rural 
consumers that can pay for them. Even if  technological progress has 
improved affordability of  small-scale solar solutions for an increasing 
number of  rural consumers, public subsidies still have an important role 
to play for universal access to become a reality in Kenya.
Notes
1 Including two representatives from private off-grid generation 
developers (Powergen and Powerhive); the national transmission 
utility (KETRACO); one donor (Power Africa); civil society (Nature 
Kenya, Strathmore University); the energy regulator ERC; the 
Ministry of  Land; an independent power producer (IPP) (Kenya Tea 
Development Authority – Power); and the National Environment 
Management Authority.
2 Interview with Powerhive, 2016.
3 Interview with ERC, 2016.
4 www.eca‑uk.com/2017/01/04/kenya‑mini‑grid‑regulatory‑
framework‑development/.
5 Interviews with donor representative and with Ministry of  Planning, 
2016.
6 Interview with KETRACO, 2016.
7 Interview with Power Africa, 2016.
8 The off-taker is the counterparty in the PPA purchasing all the power 
from the plant.
9 Interview with KETRACO, 2016.
10 Interview with KETRACO, 2016.
11 Interview with Power Africa, 2016.
12 Interview with the Ministry of  Planning, 2016.
13 Interview with Powerhive, 2016.
14 Interview with the Ministry of  Planning, 2016.
15 Interview with KETRACO, 2016.
16 Interview with KETRACO, 2016.
17 Interview with Powerhive, 2016. This problem was also detailed 
in interviews with an international EPC contractor as detailed in 
Pueyo et al. (2017).
18 Interview with Energy Regulatory Commission, 2016.
19 Interview with National Environmental Management Agency, 2016.
20 Interview with KETRACO, 2016.
21 Interviews with ERC and KETRACO, 2016.
22 Interview with Nature Kenya, 2016.
23 Interview with KETRACO, 2016.
24 Interview with ERC, 2016.
25 The Equator Principles are a risk management framework adopted 
by financial institutions to assess and manage the environmental and 
social risks of  projects. See www.equator‑principles.com.
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